Abstract-This paper considers the problem of charging station pricing and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) station selection. When a PEV needs to be charged, it selects a charging station by considering the charging prices, waiting times, and travel distances. Each charging station optimizes its charging price based on the prediction of the PEVs' charging station selection decisions, and the other station's pricing decision, in order to maximize its profit. To obtain insights of such a highly coupled system, we consider a 1-D system with two competing charging stations and Poisson arriving PEVs. We propose a multileader-multifollower Stackelberg game model, in which the charging stations (leaders) announce their charging prices in stage I and the PEVs (followers) make their charging station selections in stage II. We show that there always exists a unique charging station selection equilibrium in stage II, and such equilibrium depends on the charging stations' service capacities and the price difference between them. We then characterize the sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the pricing equilibrium in stage I. We also develop a low complexity algorithm that efficiently computes the pricing equilibrium and the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage Stackelberg game.
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I. INTRODUCTION

S
INCE the sales of the first highway-capable all electrical vehicle Tesla Roadster in 2008, there have been more than 290,000 similar plug-in electrical vehicles (PEVs) sold in the U.S. as of December 2014. As PEVs help reduce the emission of greenhouse gas, there has been a growing interest from both industry and academia in terms of the technology and economics aspects of PEV deployment [1] - [9] .
One important limitation for the PEV is its limited battery capacity. A wide deployment of PEVs requires an extensive charging station network, which fortunately is being deployed in many countries. For example, today there are more EV charging points than gas stations in Japan [10] . In the U.S., operators such as CarCharging provide national-wide public PEV charging services. As the number of charging operators in the electrical vehicle market increases, the issue of competitive pricing among charging stations is getting increasingly important and practical. For example, in some Chinese cities including Beijing and Qingdao, PEV owners have to pay service fees in addition to electricity bills to charge their cars. The government declares the maximally allowed service fee, and the operators such as Tellus Power and Potevio set their own charging prices (i.e., the sum of electricity price and service price) to maximize their own revenue subject to the government rules.
The owners of the PEVs, on the other hand, are able to identify multiple close-by charging stations using mobile applications such as PlugShare [11] , and choose those that offer the best cost and distance tradeoff. The interactions between the charging stations and (owners of) PEVs will determine the dynamics and equilibrium of such a charging market.
In this work, we aim to answer the following key research questions:
• How should a PEV select a charging station based on the charging prices, travel distances, and the expected waiting times of multiple close-by stations?
• How should a charging station optimize its charging price to maximize its profit, considering the decisions of the competing charging stations and the responses of the PEVs?
Addressing these questions are challenging due to the tight coupling, among different PEVs, among multiple charging stations, and between PEVs and charging stations.
To shed some insights on this complicated problem, we consider a stylized one-dimensional system model, with two competing charging stations and dynamically arriving PEVs. The charging stations announce their charging prices simultaneously at the beginning of a day, and the PEVs make their selections asynchronously during the day as their charging needs arise. We formulate the problem as a multi-leader-multifollower Stackelberg game [12] , in which the charging stations are the leaders making decisions in Stage I, and the PEVs are the followers making decisions in Stage II. We then characterize the charging stations' pricing and the PEVs' selection behaviors at the equilibria of this game.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• Novel and Practical Model: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that jointly studies competitive charging 1949-3053 c 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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station pricing and PEV station selection. Our model considers the heterogenous service capabilities and asymmetric locations of charging stations. It also captures a PEV's waiting time before it receives the charging service, hence is different from existing PEV station selection models in the literature.
• Analysis and Insights: Under any fixed charging station prices, we show that there always exists a unique PEV station selection equilibrium. We further show that such an equilibrium can be one of five types (three pure-strategy ones and two mixed-strategy ones), depending on the prices and the service capacities. Then we characterize the sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of charging station pricing equilibrium, considering the PEVs' station selection behaviors. Our analysis suggests that a charging station with a position advantage usually declares a higher equilibrium price than its competitor.
• Efficient Algorithm: We propose a low complexity algorithm to compute the pricing equilibrium, which may not require explicit information exchange between the charging stations and is provably convergent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related work. Section III presents the system model. We analyze the equilibria for our proposed games in Sections IV and V, respectively. In Section VI, we propose the algorithm to compute the pricing equilibrium. Numerical results are provided in Section VII, followed by the concluding remarks in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Pricing Behaviour of Charging Stations
Existing literature on multi-station pricing models can be divided into two categories depending on the relationship among charging stations: non-competitive and competitive.
1) Non-Competitive Pricing:
Bayram et al. in [13] assumed that all charging stations have the same charging prices, and proposed a method to optimize the prices to maximize the sum of the utilities of all charging stations. In [14] , Bayram et al. proposed a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game, in which the charging network operator acts as the leader and the EV customers are the followers. The leader optimizes the prices of charging stations, and each follower makes a selection between the nearest station and a less busy one. Ban et al. in [15] investigated the PEV allocation and dynamic price control for multiple charging stations. Different from [13] , the authors in [15] considered heterogeneous prices. Assuming that each PEV prefers the charging station with the lowest price, the authors of [15] proposed a price control scheme to implement optimal PEV allocation.
2) Competitive Pricing:
Escudero-Garzas and Seco-Granados in [16] studied the competitive pricing of multiple charging stations using the Bertrand's oligopoly model. The demand for each charging station was assumed to be a linearly decreasing function of its price. Lee et al. in [17] assumed that the EVs are uniformly distributed and select their charging station based on the prices, the distances, and the preferences. Furthermore, every charging station is able to generate electricity and can sell its electricity to the power grid and the EVs. The authors of [17] formulated the price competition among multiple charging stations as a supermodular game model. A key assumption of [17] is that the choices of PEVs are independent of each other, which is not the case in our model.
B. Hotelling Game Model
Our model is related to the hotelling game [18] , where two geographically separated sellers compete to serve customers at different locations. However, most hotelling game models cannot be directly used to understand the interplay between charging stations and PEVs, since they do not consider the dependence among the customers' decisions [18] - [20] . Gallay and Hongler in [21] extended the hotelling game by introducing the waiting time cost, hence the customers' decisions are coupled due to the consideration for waiting time. However, the model in [21] did not consider the competition among stations and assumed that all stations announce the same price.
C. Summary
This work differs from the existing results in two respects. 1) In our system, the PEVs take into account their expected waiting times when selecting charging stations. The waiting time is non-negligible for the PEVs due to their relatively long charging times [22] , [23] . This is a key difference between our work and the existing models developed for gasoline stations [24] , [25] , where the queueing delay at the station is considerably shorter. 2) Our Stackelberg game (i.e., leader-follower game) jointly studies the PEVs' station selecting and the charging stations' pricing decisions, instead of treating only one of them in the literature. More specifically, we consider two leaders (i.e., charging stations) who choose prices to optimize their own revenues. This is different from the single-leader model studied in [14] , [22] , and [23] . Due to the high complexity of solving the general form of the considered problem, here we focus on a simple onedimensional system with two stations. The insights from the work can help us understand more general systems involving more than two stations with more general locations.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND GAME MODEL As shown in Fig. 1 , our system is represented by a line segment, denoted by [−L, L]. The line model also applies to the scenario where both stations are along a zigzag or curving road without major branches within a significant distance. The charging stations, which belong to different operators, are located at x 1 and x 2 (−L < x 1 < x 2 < L), respectively. 1 We allow the two stations to be asymmetrically located on the line, i.e., x 1 = −x 2 .
Each charging station serves its customers (i.e., the PEVs waiting in its queue) on a first come first served basis. 2 Suppose that charging station i ∈ {1, 2} has k i ≥ 1 identical charging ports, and the service (charging) time for a PEV follows a general distribution with a mean 1 μ i (μ i > 0 is the average charging rate) and a variance σ 2 i . Accordingly, we can use k i μ i to measure the service capacity of charging station i. Without losing of generality, we assume that k 1 μ 1 ≥ k 2 μ 2 . In practice, it is possible to have μ 1 = μ 2 if the charging stations use different levels of charge specifications [16] or different chargers (such as AC Level 2 charger and DC Fast charger).
The system works in two stages:
• In Stage I, two charging stations simultaneously determine their charging prices at the beginning of a time period, 3 and periodically broadcast the (fixed) prices together with the stations' locations to the potential customers (PEVs) throughout the day (e.g., through a mobile app such as PlugShare).
• In Stage II, given the charging prices and the locations of both charging stations, every PEV independently selects a charging station to recharge its battery. We assume that the PEV driver does not have any prior preference regarding which direction he would drive on the road.
Note that the decisions among the PEVs, among the charging stations, and between PEVs and charging stations are actually interdependent. To characterize the interplay of PEVs and charging stations, we propose a two-stage Stackelberg model, which consists of two games at two different levels:
• Charging Station Pricing Game (CSPG): In Stage I, the charging stations engage in a CSPG game, in which they determine their charging prices by considering each other's pricing choices and the PEVs' selection choices in Stage II.
• PEV Station Selection Game (PSSG): In Stage II, the PEVs engage in a PSSG game, in which each PEV selects its charging station under fixed prices from the charging stations, by considering the station choices of other PEVs.
With this hierarchical game, we aim to derive a stable decision outcome for charging stations and PEVs.
A. PEV Station Selection Game in Stage II
The PSSG game is defined as follows:
• Players: The PEVs.
• Strategies: The strategy of a PEV n corresponds to its station choice s n (x) ∈ {1, 2}, where x is the location of PEV n.
• Payoffs: The payoff of a PEV is the negative value of its cost, which includes three parts: traveling cost, waiting time, and charging cost. 1 In practice, the charging stations in the same small region may be controlled by different operators. In Frisco, Texas, USA, for example, the distance between two charging stations owned by two different operators (Voltaic Electrical and Blink Network) can be shorter than 10 Kilometers. 2 In this work, we do not consider the stations with a battery replacement strategy [3] . 3 Different time periods can have different PEV arrival rates and electricity prices.
1) Traveling Cost:
We assume that the there is no traffic jam and the traveling delay is determined by the traveling distance only. Let l n,s n denote the distance from the current location of PEV n (i.e., x) to the selected charging station s n . Then we have l n,s n = |x − x s n |. The traveling cost of PEV n is k l l n,s n , where k l > 0.
2) Charging Cost: For simplicity, we assume all PEVs have the same battery capacity, start to charge when their battery is close to empty (or to the same level of charging level suggested by the manufacturer), and want to get fully charged before leaving the station. Hence all PEVs have the same demand. 4 We use d to denote charging demand of an PEV, and p s n to denote the price of the selected charging station. The charging cost is k p dp s n , where k p > 0.
3) Waiting Time: Now we estimate the waiting time using queueing theory. The inter-arrival time between two consecutive PEVs arriving at the same charging station depends on two factors: 1) the time interval between the time instances at which these two PEVs decide to seek charging service, and 2) the difference between the travel times to the station. Since a PEV will only consider charging stations close-by, we assume that the difference between the travel times to these two stations are negligible. 5 We further assume that the time interval between the charging decisions of two consecutive PEVs at the same location (the time instances when they decide seeking charging services) is exponentially distributed. If all the PEVs generated from this location select the same charging station, then the time interval between the arrivals of two consecutive PEVs at the station is exponentially distributed. Accordingly, we can consider the PEV stream generated from this location as Poisson arrivals, or a Poisson stream [2] , [13] , [26] - [29] . We also assume that the PEV streams are uniformly distributed in the entire one-dimensional system. Then, we consider the stream of PEVs from any line segment as an aggregation of PEV streams, which is also Poisson [30] .
Suppose that the arrival rate of the PEVs coming from a unit line segment is λ > 0.
be the set of locations of the PEVs who select charging station i. In general, A i might include multiple disjoint segments. We use |A i | to denote the total length of A i . Then, the arrival rate of the PEVs selecting charging station i is |A i |λ.
Due to the small penetration of PEVs in today's market, λ is usually small and the probability that a station having no waiting room for a PEV will be very small. For simplicity, here we employ the theory of M/G/k queue [32] to estimate the waiting time of a PEV at 4 Another way to understand the homogeneous demand assumption is to consider the charging station's perspective. Since the charging station does not have complete information of the PEVs, then it will be difficult for the station to predict the precise demand of each PEV. As considering the M/G/k queueing model used in this paper is already complicated enough, we simply use the average demand of the PEVs to represent the demand of each PEV, so that the charging station can compute the competitive charging price. 5 Take charging station 1 as an example. The difference between the travel times of two PEVs is no more than
v , where v is the speed of PEVs. If v equals to 60 kph and |L − x 1 | is 5 km, it will be no more than 5 mins. On the other hand, if a PEV is charged on a standard 120-volt outlet, it usually needs 8 hours to be fully charged. If the PEV uses a dedicated 240 circuit, it may need 3 hours. If the PEV uses a 480V circuit, it needs 20 to 30 mins [31] . a station. 6 Then the mean waiting time of a PEV at charging station i is given by
where
. In (1), k i , μ i and σ i are the parameters of charging stations, and λ is the parameter of PEVs.
Using the above notations, the payoff of PEV n is defined as
where s = {s n , n ∈ N } is the strategy profile of all PEVs (which can also be captured by A 1 and A 2 ), N is the set of all PEVs, and k q > 0.
Since there are no direct communications between PEVs, we assume that a PEV does not know other PEVs' decisions when making its decision. Hence, although the PEVs make charging station selection asynchronously during the day, we can model PSSG as a simultaneous move (or static) game. 7 
B. Charging Station Pricing Game in Stage I
• Players: The charging stations.
• Strategies: The strategy of a charging station i is its price p i .
• Payoffs: The payoff of a charging station includes two parts: 1) the revenue of providing charging service to the PEVs, and 2) the fixed and operational costs. In CSPG, the charging stations simultaneously determine their charging prices p 1 and p 2 . We assume that p i ∈ [p min , p max ], and the unit electricity cost paid by a charging station i to the utility company is c i ≤ p min . Charging station i has a fixed costč i for providing the service (such as labour cost), which is assumed to be independent of the number of PEVs requesting the service. The payoff of charging station i can be written as
Here D i (p i , p j ) = |A i |d is the total demand of the PEVs selecting charging station i, which depends on the prices of both stations. Next we will derive the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the Stackelberg game, which represents a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of every subgame of the game. Under an SPE, neither PEVs nor charging stations have incentives to change their strategies. Hence SPE corresponds to the stable pricing and station selection outcome. We use backward induction to derive the SPE. More specifically, we start with Stage II (PSSG) and analyze the PEVs' selection given prices p 1 and p 2 . Then, we look at Stage I (CSPG) and analyze how charging stations make the pricing decisions, taking the PEVs' responses in Stage II into consideration.
IV. PEV STATION SELECTION GAME IN STAGE II
Under a given price pair (p 1 , p 2 ), every PEV selects a charging station to maximize its payoff in (2) . If too many PEVs select the charging station i such that
≥ 1, the queue at charging station i grows to infinity. Clearly, the PEVs will try to avoid overloading a charging station due to the concern about the waiting time. However, when k 1 μ 1 + k 2 μ 2 ≤ 2Lλ holds, overload is inevitable since the total serving capacity of two stations is not enough to serve all the PEVs. In this situation, one should increase the number of ports (i.e., k i ) or introduce better (faster) charging technologies (e.g., DC Fast charging). In this paper, we will consider the more meaningful case of k 1 μ 1 + k 2 μ 2 > 2Lλ, which means that by appropriately selecting their stations, the PEVs can avoid overloading any charging station.
The above discussions reveal that the service capacity of a charging station, i.e., k i μ i , has a significant impact on the PEVs' decisions. For example, if 2Lλ k i μ i approaches 1, some PEVs must select charging station j = i to avoid overloading charging station i. For the convenience of later discussions, we can classify different levels of a charging station's service capacity in terms of FULL, HIGH, MIDDLE and LOW.
Take charging station 1 for example. As shown in Fig. 2 , FULL means that station 1 alone can serve all the PEVs in the system (along the entire segment of length 2L) without being overloaded. HIGH, MIDDLE, and LOW indicate that the station can serve the PEVs in a segment with a length x + L, where x 2 < x < L for HIGH, x 1 < x < x 2 for MIDDLE and −L < x < x 1 for LOW. Such a terminology allows us to classify the system model into nine scenarios 8 : 
As an example, let us look at the FULL-HIGH scenario. In this scenario, charging station 1 has the full service capacity and can serve all the PEVs. Charging station 2 has a limited service capacity, specified by (L − x 1 )λ < k 2 μ 2 ≤ 2Lλ. Therefore, it can serve only some of PEVs in the system due to
Since there are many PEVs in this model, we can view the Stage II game as a population game [33] , where a single PEV's selection change will not affect the lengths of sets A 1 and A 2 and the corresponding waiting times at the two stations. Let us use U n (s n ; A 1 , A 2 ) to denote PEV n's payoff, where other PEVs' station choices are represented by sets A 1 and A 2 . To maximize its payoff, a PEV compares the payoffs of selecting two charging stations. If U n (i; A 1 , A 2 ) ≥ U n ( j; A 1 , A 2 ), PEV n will select charging station i instead of j. When no PEV has an incentive to change its selection unilaterally, a stable decision outcome emerges. Such outcome corresponds to the NE of PSSG, which is define as follows.
Definition 1: A strategy profile s * = {s * n , ∀n ∈ N } is an NE of the PSSG if U n (s * n ; A 1 , A 2 ) ≥ U n (s n ; A 1 , A 2 ) for every n ∈ N , where s n is the different charging station selection than s * n . We will show that there exist at most five types of NEs in PSSG, i.e., three pure-strategy NEs and two mixed-strategy NEs, as shown in Fig. 3 . Which type of NE will emerge depends on the price difference between the charging stations and the type of system model scenario.
A. The FULL-FULL Scenario
In the FULL-FULL scenario, all five types of NEs can emerge under different prices.
1) Pure-Strategy NE With an Indifference Point: In most cases, every PEV has one preferred charging station. According to (2) , under given A 1 and A 2 , a PEV determines its preferred charging station based on its location and the price difference p 1 − p 2 . We may find a particular location, where a PEV at this location is indifferent of selecting between the two charging stations, i.e., U n (1; A 1 , A 2 ) = U n (2; A 1 , A 2 ) . We call such location the indifference point, denoted by x * .
The existence of an indifference point actually depends on the price difference p 1 − p 2 . Intuitively, the indifference point may not exist if |p 1 − p 2 | is too high (in which case all PEVs prefer the same charging station). When an indifference point exists, we have a pure-strategy charging station selection NE.
To characterize the conditions for such a pure-strategy NE, we define two thresholds as follows,
Then we have the following theorem.
where x * is the unique root of
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A. At the NE described in Theorem 1, all the PEVs on the left side of the indifference point select charging station 1, and the rest PEVs select charging station 2, as shown in Fig. 2 (a) . In other words, the one-dimensional system can be divided into two continuous segments, each of which is served by one charging station.
2) Mixed-Strategy NE: By analyzing (5), we can show that x * decreases with p 1 − p 2 . As p 1 − p 2 increases, x * will move closer to x 1 , and charging station 2 will attract more PEVs. Once p 1 − p 2 = θ R 1 , the indifference point x * = x 1 . In this case, charging station 2 attracts all the PEVs on the right side of station 1 at the NE.
Once the price difference p 1 − p 2 > θ R 1 , a new type of equilibrium emerges and it is no longer a pure-strategy NE. At this equilibrium, some PEVs in the range of [−L, x 1 ] select charging station 1, while other PEVs in the same range [−L, x 1 ] select charging station 2. In fact, for a PEV in the range of [−L, x 1 ], whether selecting station 1 or station 2 no longer depends on its location; it only depends on the values of |A 1 | and |A 2 |. We illustrate such an equilibrium in Fig. 3 (b) , where the fraction of PEVs in the range of [−L, x 1 ] selecting charging station 1 (denoted by the red segment) needs to be properly chosen, such that U n (1; A 1 , A 2 ) = U n (2; A 1 , A 2 ) for all PEVs in this range, which corresponds to a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Similarly, when p 1 − p 2 < θ L 1 , we have another mixed strategy equilibrium, as shown in Fig. 3 (c) .
More formally, under a mixed-strategy equilibrium, some PEV will randomly select two strategies with some positive probabilities for both. Let ω 1 (x) and 1 − ω 1 (x) denote the probability of the PEV at a location x selecting charging stations 1 and 2, respectively. Then we use (ω 1 (x), 1 − ω 1 (x)) to represent the mixed-strategy of such a PEV.
Before characterizing the mixed-strategy NE, we further define two more thresholds,
, then the NE strategy of PEV n at a location x is
where ω 1 is the unique root of the following equation in the range of [0, 1],
The proof of Theorem 2 is give in Appendix B.
3) Pure-Strategy NE With a Dominant Station: From (7) and (9), we can show that ω 1 decreases with p 1 − p 2 in both cases. When p 1 − p 2 reaches the critical point θ L 2 (or θ R 2 ), all the PEVs select charging station 1 (or 2), as shown in Fig. 2  (d) (or Fig. 2(e) ). This leads to a new type of pure-strategy NE, where all PEVs adopt the same strategy and choose the same "dominant" station. Furthermore, if charging station 1 (or 2) keeps decreasing below θ L 2 (or increasing above θ R 2 ), the selection outcome will remain unchanged, as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Consider the FULL-FULL scenario. If
, then the NE strategy of any PEV is s * n (x) = 1. Please refer to our online technical report [34] for the proof of Theorem 3. According to Theorems 1 to 3, we can conclude that PSSG always has a unique NE.
B. The Other Eight Scenarios
In the other eight scenarios, however, not all types of NEs can emerge due to the limited service capacity of at least one charging station. For illustration, here we consider two scenarios: HIGH-HIGH and MIDDLE-MIDDLE.
1) HIGH-HIGH:
In this scenario, k i μ i ≤ 2λL for any i ∈ {1, 2}, and neither station can serve all the PEVs in the system. Therefore, the NEs shown in Fig. (d) and Fig. (e) cannot be achieved, and there exist three types of NE in this scenario, as shown in Fig. 3(a), Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c) .
Theorem 4: (1) In the HIGH-HIGH scenario, if p
where x * is the unique root of (5) 
where ω 1 is the unique root of (7) and
where ω 1 is the unique root of (9) and 0 < ω 1 <
. The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. Hence we omit the proof due to space limit.
2) MIDDLE-MIDDLE:
In this scenario, the NEs shown in Fig. 3 (b), Fig. 3 (c), Fig. 3 (d) , and Fig. 3 (e) cannot be achieved, as neither station has enough capacity (to serve the PEVs neighbouring its competitor). Therefore, there exists only one type of NE, as shown in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5: In the MIDDLE-MIDDLE scenario, the indifference point is unique and the NE strategy of PEV n at location x is
where x * is the unique root of (5) and L−
The proof of Theorem 5 is similar to that of Theorem 1, and hence is omitted here.
3) Summary: The above equilibrium analysis method is also applicable to the other scenarios. Here we summarize the equilibrium analysis for them in Table I . It should be pointed out that our analysis is applicable to a more general system. In our online technical report [34] , we show how to extend our low-level game to some more general scenarios.
V. CHARGING STATION PRICING GAME IN STAGE I
Now we analyze the Nash equilibrium of CSPG in Stage I, given the NE of PSSG. Such analysis will lead to the SPE of the entire two-stage game.
To calculate the payoffs of the charging stations, we first derive the demand of each charging station. Take charging station 1 in the FULL-FULL scenario as an example. 
Given its competitor's price, a charging station can compute the best price that maximizes its payoffs, defined by (3). We denote the charging station i's best pricing choice as its best response, which is a function of the price p j , i.e., B i (p j ). We have
When the prices of both charging stations are mutual best responses, we have achieved the NE of the CSPG game, denoted by (p * 1 , p * 2 ), which satisfies
Next Theorem characterizes the condition for the existence and uniqueness of the pricing equilibrium. 9 Theorem 6: Suppose i, j ∈ {1, 2} (i = j) and consider a region [a, b] 10 The proof of Theorem 6 can be found in Appendix C. In most of our simulations, conditions 2) and 3) are satisfied by a = p min and b = p max . We can view B i (p j ) − p j as the best price offset of charging station i. Condition 3) implies that when the competitor's price increases, a charging station's best price offset will decrease. This means that although charging station i might increase its price p i by responding to its competitor station j's price increase, the price gap will reduce. 9 Even for a convex game, the uniqueness of the NE is not guaranteed. Hence we cannot employ the convexity of Q i to prove the uniqueness of NE in our game. 10 B i (p j ) does not need to be a strictly monotonic function.
Condition 1), however, is not always easy to satisfy in simulations. However, we note that conditions 1) -3) are sufficient but not necessary conditions, and a pricing equilibrium may exist even if these conditions are not satisfied (as observed from our simulations). For the simplicity of analysis, we will assume that all three conditions in Theorem 6 are satisfied by a = p min and b = p max .
VI. COMPUTING THE EQUILIBRIUM
As characterizing the closed-form pricing equilibrium in CSPG in Stage I is very challenging, next we will focus on developing a low-complexity algorithm to compute the pricing equilibrium. 
and
In the above equations, d(t) represents the search direction, δ(t) is the step size and α is a constant in (0, 1).
indicates that DSSA has leaped over p * 1 in the previous iteration. Accordingly, DSSA changes its search direction and continues to search p * 1 with a smaller step size. We show the details of DSSA in Algorithm 1. Notice that each charging station i executes Algorithm 1 independently without synchronization. In addition, if the charging stations' locations, service capacity, unit electricity cost, and feasible price range are public information, DSSA does not require any explicit information exchange between the charging stations, as each charging station i can compute the function Θ i locally.
Theorem 7: The DSSA algorithm converges to an SPE of our Stackelberg game.
Please find the proof of Theorem 7 in Appendix E.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We numerically verify our equilibrium analysis and the performance of the proposed algorithm. Unless specified otherwise, we choose system parameters as follows: L = 10,
Update d(t) and δ(t) with (19) and (18), respectively; Update p i (t + 1) with (17) , and t = t + 1; 
c 1 =č 2 = 1, and ε = 0.001.
A. Charging Station Selection Equilibrium in Stage II
1) FULL-FULL:
We first consider the FULL-FULL scenario with μ 1 = 16 and μ 2 = 14, in which both charging stations are able to serve all PEVs. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the indifference point location x * and the probability of selecting charging station 1 (ω 1 ) under various values of price differ-
.0881, and θ R 2 = 0.0988. Fig. 4 shows when p 1 − p 2 increases from θ L 1 to θ R 1 , x * decreases from x 2 to x 1 . This corresponds to the result in Theorem 1, and shows that a larger price difference p 1 − p 2 will lead to more PEVs choosing charging station 2. Fig. 5 provides the values of probability ω 1 of the PEVs in the ranges of [−L,
, L] is between 1 and 0. In other words, all the PEVs in [−L, x 2 ] select station 1, and the PEVs in [x 2 , L] select station 1 with probability ω 1 and station 2 with probability 1−ω 1 
For EVs produced by Tesla, the battery capacities can be 60 kwh, 70 kwh, 85 kwh, etc. Here we assume d to be 60 kwh. 12 In some Chinese cities, the electricity price is about 0.15 U.S. dollar, and the maximally allowed charging price is about 0.3 U.S. dollar. 
we will have a pure-strategy equilibrium in which all PEVs choose station 2 or station 1.
2) Other Scenarios: Now we consider the HIGH-HIGH scenario with μ 1 = 9.5 and μ 2 = 9.1. Similar to Fig. 4 , have ω 1 < 0.8 =
(L+x 1 )λ . This is consistent with Theorem 4. Fig. 8 shows the location of the indifference point in the MIDDLE-MIDDLE scenario with μ 1 = 7 and μ 2 = 6. It is obvious that the indifference point is in the range of (−2, 4), which coincides with
. This is consistent with Theorem 5.
Finally, we consider the HIGH-LOW scenario with μ 1 = 9 and μ 2 = 2. Fig. 9 provides the values of ω 1 of the PEVs in the range of [x 2 , L] in this scenario. It can be seen that ω 1 is within the range of (0.2, 0.6), which corresponds to
). Fig. 9 tells that if a station has a sufficient service capacity but its competitor is limited in service capacity, it can always attract some PEVs no matter how high its price is. In our simulation, station 2 has a much lower service capacity. Therefore, the PEVs on the right side of station 2 still choose station 1 with a probability greater than 0.2 even when the price difference is relatively high, e.g., 3.
B. Pricing Equilibrium of CSPG
We first illustrate the conditions in Theorem 6. Let us consider the FULL-FULL scenario with μ 1 = 16, μ 2 = 14, and p i ∈ [0.25, 0.3]. Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the best price offset and the best response, respectively. According to Fig. 10 , the best price offset, i.e., B i (p j )) − p j (i = j), is strictly decreasing with its competitor's price. As shown in Fig. 11 , the best response curves of charging station 1 and 2 are both increasing.
Next we numerically compute the NE of CSPG through computing the intersection of the best response functions of both charging stations. In Fig. 11, (p min , p max ) = (0.25, 0.3) , and the intersection of the best response curves corresponds to the NE (0.269, 0.282). Now we consider the other two FULL-FULL scenarios.
• Fig. 12 shows the best response curves in the scenarios with μ 1 = 16, μ 2 = 14 and (p min , p max ) = (0.2, 0.27). It can be seen that the intersection of the best response curves indicates the NE (0. 26, 0.27) . In this simulation, p max is small and the candidate prices are relatively low. As a result, the best price offset is often positive. This means that each charging station has an incentive to further increase its price. This explains why a high equilibrium price is adopted by each station.
• In Fig. 13 , we characterize the best response curves in the scenario with μ 1 = 16, μ 2 = 14 and (p min , p max ) = (0.25, 0.3). Different from the case in Fig. 11 , we set the location of station 2 to x 1 = 9 instead of x 1 = 5 in Fig. 13 . Now we compare the NEs shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 13 . Although station 2 declares a higher equilibrium price than its competitor in Fig. 11 , the opposite outcome is true in Fig. 13 . This is because station 2 is relatively far away from the middle point in the case of Fig. 13 than the case of Fig. 11 , hence needs to announce a smaller price to attract the PEVs.
C. The DSSA Algorithm
Finally, we demonstrate the convergence and computational efficiency of DSSA. As mentioned in Section VI, when |B i (B j (p i ))−p i |/p i ≤ ε, DSSA converges to the NE. We consider the scenarios corresponding to Fig. 11 -Fig. 13 , and show the iterations of DSSA in Fig. 14 -Fig. 16 
VIII. CONCLUSION
This work studies the charging station pricing and PEV station selection through a two-stage Stackelberg game. We characterize the charging station selection equilibrium in Stage II, and characterize the sufficient conditions for the existence of the pricing equilibrium in Stage I. We also develop a low complexity algorithm to compute the equilibria of the entire game. In the future work, we will focus on more general system models considering more than two charging stations, networks of roads, and the impact of traffic conditions.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Remark 1: Suppose a PEV n at x adopts a strategy s * n at an NE in PSSG. If s * n = 1, all the PEVs at x < x take the strategy s * n (x ) = 1 at that NE. If s * n = 2, all the PEVs at x > x take the strategy s * n (x ) = 2 at that NE. According to Remark 1, we know that if when an indifference point exists and a corresponding NE is achieved, the PEVs on the left side of the indifference point choose station 1 and the PEVs on the right side of the indifference point choose station 2.
Next we will first prove that the root to (5) is unique. Then we will show that the strategy profile corresponding to (4) is an NE. Finally, we will prove that no other NE exists.
A. Existence and Uniqueness of the Root to
Similarly, we can prove that f (x 2 ) > 0. Hence we can conclude that f (x) = 0 holds for some x ∈ (x 1 , x 2 ). Furthermore, f (x) is a strictly monotonic increasing function. Hence there exists one unique root satisfying f (x) = 0.
B. Nash Equilibrium
If every PEV adopts the strategy described by (4), |A 1 | = x * +L and |A 2 | = L−x * . We first consider the PEVs on the left side of the indifference point. If a PEV n at x selects station 1, its payoff is U n (1, s −n ) = −k p dp 1 
If it selects station 2, its payoff is U n (2, s −n ) = −k p dp 2 
Hence, PEV n prefers station 1 to station 2.
Similarly, we can prove that the PEVs on the right side of the indifference point prefers station 2 to station 1. In all, with the strategy described by (4) , no PEV has an incentive to unilaterally change its station selection. That is, the strategy profile corresponding to (4) is an NE.
C. Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
We have proved that the NE is unique when an indifference point exists. Now we consider the case where indifference point does not exist.
The indifference point exists in the scenario where the PEVs in the range of [−L, x * ) or (x * , L] choose the same equilibrium strategy. The situation where no indifference point exists will emerge when some PEVs take different equilibrium strategy. In the following, we prove that this situation will never emerge by contradiction.
We first consider the case where a different pure-strategy NE exists. Suppose at least one PEV at x < x * selects station 2 at such NE. Assume that among these PEVs, PEV n has the smallest position, i.e.,x. Clearly, all the PEVs on the right side of PEV n select station 2 at this NE since they are closer to station 2 than PEV n. As for the PEVs on the left side of PEV n, all of them select station 1. 13 This results in the situation where the PEVs in the segment [−L,x) or (x, L] choose the same equilibrium strategy, which is impossible. Similarly, we can analyze the case where at least one PEV at x > x * selects station 1 when a different NE is achieved.
The proof for the case where some PEV chooses a mixed strategy at a different NE is similar and hence is omitted.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We consider the case of
is similar, and is omitted here. 13 Otherwise, PEV n is not the one with the smallest position.
A. Existence and Uniqueness of the Root to (7)
For convenience, let 
B. Nash Equilibrium
When every PEV adopts the strategy given by (6) ,
In the following, we consider a PEV n at x in two cases: 1)
In case 1, we have
In case 2, we have
In both cases, selecting station 2 is better than station 1. Therefore, all the PEVs on the right side of station 1 have no incentives to unilaterally change its strategy.
Next, we consider the PEVs on the left side of station 1. When a PEV m at y (−L ≤ y ≤ x 1 ) adopts the strategy given by (6), we have U m (1, s −m ) = −k p dp 1 − k1 (|A 1 |) − k l (x 1 − y) (24) and U m (2, s −m ) = −k p dp 2 − k2 (|A 2 |) − k l (x 2 − y) (25) Since ω 1 solves (7), we have U m (1, The above equation indicates that PEV m cannot benefit from deviating from the mixed strategy (ω 1 , 1 − ω 1 ) unilaterally. In all, we can conclude that the strategy profile corresponding to (6) 
It completes the proof.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 7
For simplicity, we only consider the case where i = 1 and α is sufficient large. 14 For any non-equilibrium point p 1 (t), there exist two cases: 1) p 1 (t) < p * 1 , and 2) p 1 (t) > p * 1 . In the following, we only consider case 1, and case 2 can be analyzed in a similar fashion. Let P 1 (τ ) = p 1 (t). As shown in Fig. 17 , we can define a mapping T(·) as
Clearly, our iterative algorithm DSSA can be characterized by P 1 (τ + 1) = T (P 1 (τ ) ). Now we consider two cases.
(1) If T(P 1 (τ ) = p 1 (t + 1), we have
(2) If T(P 1 (τ ) = p 1 (t + 2), we have
In both cases, the distance between the candidate solution and the equilibrium is shortened by the mapping. There exist a positive constant γ (0 ≤ γ < 1) satisfying |T(P 1 (τ )) − p * 1 | ≤ γ |p * 1 − P 1 (τ )| (∀τ > 0). It indicates T is a pseudocontraction mapping [36] . According to Proposition 1.2 of [36] , DSSA converges to p * 1 . Furthermore, we know the convergence is Q-linear [37] .
